We May Lose War Comment Shows Prescience


20 APril 1945  Deputy Cheif Of Operations of German armed forces high command “…mentions the possibility that the war could have a negative outcome.”

If only I could foretell events with the accuracy of Wehrmacht Major-General August Winter my life would be so much better!

According to Official War Diary of the the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces High Commmand):

“…on the morning of 20 April 1945, the Deputy-Chief of Wehrmacht Operations Staff, Major General Winter, gives an address on the occasion of Hitler’s birthday and mentions the possibility that the war could have a negative outcome.”

When he gave this brief talk, the Russians were less than 18 kilometers from the HQ of the German Armed Forces High Command and most of the officers left the facilities shortly thereafter.

These facilities were massive underground bunkers completely bombproof and camoflauged. Remnants of the complex still exist.

A telephone exchange of the complex, 1942. The two huge underground complexes were known as Maybach I and Maybach II located in Zossen, thirty kilometers from Berlin.


2 May 1945     orders to berlin garrsion:
“…Together with the commander-in-chief of the Soviet forces I order you to stop fighting immediately.” WEIDLING, General of Artillery, Commandant of the Berlin Defence Zone.”

8 May 1945 Germans surrender unconditionally on all fronts to the Allied powers and the Soviet Union.

Confusion: The Organization of the German High Command On D-Day



Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, General Dwight Eisenhower, seen here wearing the five stars of General of the Army, a wartime rank specially authorized by Congress.

There was one person in charge of the Allied invasion of Europe and subsequent campaign to defeat Nazi Germany: General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces. All Allied military forces came under his command with an occasional exception. Most important, Eisenhower was backed by three key men: Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, US President Franklin Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. When he had to flex his muscles to bring subordinates into line, he had a lot of muscle behind him.

The Germans, who have a reputation as organized and efficient, had a command structure resembling a bowl of spaghetti thrown against a wall. In a report written for the Allies after the war and published in a fascinating volume, Fighting the Invasion: the German Army at D-Day, General Günther Blumentritt, who served as Chief of Staff to Herr General Feldmarschal Gerd von Rundstedt, Oberbefehlshaber West or ‘OB West’ (C-in-C West), wrote about the command structure which I have summarized below.

OB West reported to OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or German Armed Forces High Command), which had operational responsibility for war on the Western Front. OKH, or German Army High Command, had responsibility for the war in the east or the Ost Kreig against the Soviets. While co-located at Zossen, twenty kilometers outside of Berlin, neither organization was allowed to communicate with the other. They had completely separate compounds and bunkers and were known as Maybach 1 (OKH) and Maybach 2 (OKW). wikipedia.org/wiki/Maybach_I_and_II

Under the nominal command of OB West were Army Groups B and G which controlled all subordinate German Army forces in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. (The Military Governor of France and the Military Governor of N.France/Belgium, which had their own special units and security troops, reported directly to OKW by-passing OB West and often not even informing OB West of what they were doing).

+ Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel (left)
and Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt

However, there was a caveat here which caused the Germans to react slowly on D-Day and it is this:  only coastal defense units of German troops in France, Belgium and the Netherlands were directly subordinated to OB West.

Only if an actual invasion occurred, would the German Army commanders in Belgium and France become fully subordinated to OB West. The German Army commander in the Netherlands did not come under the authority of OB West in the event of invasion. He reported directly to OKW. However, the majority of front line German Army combat units in Holland came under the command of Army Group B and not the German Army commander in Holland. Got it?

If this wasn’t confusing enough, the Germans had a shortage of troops but not of Field Marshals. Rommel (seen above on right), the not-so-unbeatable Desert Fox, was sitting around in Germany while the unbeatable German Afrika Korps was being beaten – and later surrendered to the British 8th Army. (Eventually, the entire Deutsche Afrika Korps ended up as POWs in the United States.)

So Hitler sent Herr General Feldmarschal Rommel to France to assume command of Army Group B, which already reported to Herr General Feldmarschal von Rundstedt (seen above on left) in his capacity as OB West. So theoretically Rommel was subordinated to von Rundstedt but all German Field Marshals had the right to contact Hitler directly so it wasn’t clear that Rommel really was subordinate to von Rundstedt and both of them gave orders to Army Group B and these orders often conflicted.

A meeting in Paris in December of 1943 between  Generalleutnant (equivalent to Major-General or two star general in US Army) Alfred Gause (who looks to be wearing an AfrikaKorps cuff title), Rommel’s Chief of Staff (at right, pointing at map), with Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel (left) and Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, OB West or Commander-in-Chief, West (center). Oberst (Colonel) Bodo Zimmermann (senior staff officer to von Rundstedt is in the background).

The Luftwaffe’s Third Air Force, responsible for air operations in the West as well as anti-aircraft defense, did not come under the authority of OB West except for matters of coastal defense. Otherwise, they reported to the Luftwaffe commander for France who was in Paris and he reported to OKL (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe in Berlin) which came under the drug-addicated Reichsmarschal Göring who reported, theoretically, to OKW (Armed Forces High Command) but in actuality reported to Hitler.

Even in the event of the actual invasion, Luftwaffe units would not (and did not) come under the command of OB West. That anti-aircraft units came under Luftwaffe command is important to note since these units, often of division strength, were heavily armed with the awesome German 88s as well as all sorts of other heavy weapons. Most of the time, these anti-aircraft units provided direct fire support to German Army troops but this required good relations between local unit commanders since the Luftwaffe didn’t have to take orders from the army or vice-versa.

Marinegruppen Kommando West, (Naval Group West), reported to OKM (Oberkommando der Kreigsmarine), which came under Grand Admiral Dönitz who theoretically reported to OKW (German Armed Forces High Command) but actually reported directly to Hitler. As with the Luftwaffe, Herr General Feldmarschal Gerd von Rundstedt, Oberbefehlshaber West, could only give orders to Naval Group West on matters regarding coastal defense and even in the event of the actual invasion, OB West could not give orders to Naval Group West. What makes this even more screwed up than it looks is that the Kriegsmarine controlled all coastal artillery units since they were part of the navy.



The Waffen SS, which literally translates as ‘Armed SS’, meaning SS combat troops as opposed to SS concentration camp guards and organized murderers, came under the tactical control of local army commands in the event of invasion. Otherwise, they reported to that weak chinned killer, Reichsfuhrer Heinrich Himmler. (After the war was over, men who had served in the Waffen SS tried to claim they were simply soldiering and had nothing to do with the death camp guards, those men being in a separate unit. The concentration camp guards and murder squad SS men were in a separate unit but men transferred between these units on a regular basis.)

In the event of an Allied landing, the German strategy was to launch their reserve panzer divisions against the Allied beachhead. But, as you might imagine, the reserve panzer divisions came under the authority of the OKW, not OB West, and could only be released to OB West if he asked – which he did when the invasion began – but he was rebuffed.

Oberquartiermeister West, (Chief of Supply and Logistics), who was responsible for supplying the units which would come under OB West in the event of an invasion, reported simultaneously to three different commands, OB West, the Military Governor of France, and the Generalquartiermeister of OKH (Oberkommando das Heer or German Army High Command), all of whom could – and did – issue orders to him. Since OB West had no transport of its own, it had to borrow transport from subordinate army commands. Incredibly, these supply trucks were driven by hired French civilians who were supposed to keep driving while being attacked by Allied aircraft.

If this seems confusing, it is and it was. Herr General FeldMarschall von Rundstedt, OB West, said he had but the authority to change the guard in front of his headquarters, located in a magnificent chateaux northwest of Paris, later occupied by General Eisenhower as his headquarters.

Curiously, when von Rundstedt was dining with his senior staff officers in his personal mess, they all spoke to each other in French.

Did Hitler Refuse to Order Winter Uniforms for German Troops in Russia? A Myth Refuted

I read a lot about the Eastern Front as you can probably tell. The Germans attacked the Soviet Union on 21 June 1941. Their plan was to knock the Soviets out the war within a few months. (And they came very close.)

I often read that Hitler refused to allow the German army to order winter uniforms. His reasoning: that would be an admission that neither he nor the army believed the Germans could knock the Soviets out of the war before the Russian winter came.

When you think about it, this argument is sort of stupid and hard to believe for the simple reason that winter is cold in Germany. Even if they hadn’t invaded the Soviet Union, German soldiers would still have had winter uniforms. And regular German Army troops from the 100,000 man Reichswehr had winter uniforms as did the soldiers who became part of the army as it expanded in the mid to late 30s. They just didn’t bring them along when they invaded Russia.

So the German Army had winter uniforms. All the specifications and wool content and number of buttons, etc had all been established decades before the war with the Soviets.

The following is from At Hitler’s Side: the Memoirs of Hitler’s Luftwaffe Adjutant 1937-1945 by Nicolaus von Below (4 Stars).

On 1 November (1941), at OKH, an exhibition of Army winter uniforms was put on display. The Quartermaster General, Wagner, assured Hitler that work on winter clothing was in hand and that sufficient quantities would be made available to men in the field. Hitler took note of this report and appeared satisfied.

OKH is the abbreviation of Oberkommando das Heer, which translates as ‘German Army High Command.’ When reading German military history it is useful to keep in mind that OKH (German Army High Command) and OKW (German Armed Forces High Command) were completely separate entities. OKW functioned as Hitler’s military secretariat and ran the war in the West. OKH was the home of the German General Staff and they ran the war in the East. Most of the plots to kill Hitler came from this group.

The number one historian of military logistics in the world, Martin Van Creveld, has this to say in his fascinating book (4 stars): Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton.

Anyone who has studied the documents (that is, the records of OKH) cannot fail to be impressed by the hundreds upon hundreds of orders, directives, and circulars concerning winter supplies that began to emanate from OKH from early August onward, covering every detail, from the reconnoitring of suitable shelters to the provision of freeze proof POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) from winter clothing to veterinarian care for horses.

It’s worth noting that required veterinary care for horses was a massive task because less than 20% of the German Army was motorized. 80% of German Army transport from moving the wounded to hauling cannon was done with horses. When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, their invasion force had three and half million men and more than a million horses.